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KEYNOTE
INSURANCE SUPERVISION MEETS THE
MARKETPLACE: THE REGULATORY
RESPONSE TO DERIVATIVES AS A RISK
MANAGEMENT TOOL IN THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY
Hon. Neil D. Levin"
A lot has changed in a year. I have been the Superintendent of
Insurance since April of 1997. When I first arrived, I encountered an
industry and a supervisory infrastructure that was not really current
with the capital markets and derivatives. Also, there was no effective
dialogue between the regulatory community and the insurance
industry.
The good news is that if we fast-forward to where we are today, I
am extremely pleased with the progress that we have made at the New
York State Insurance Department (the "Department"). The
Department has put in place legislative building blocks that allow us
to discuss managing risk and expanded derivatives authority.'
We are accomplishing a lot internally at the Department. For
example, the Department had a Current Issues Seminar about a
month ago where we invited several CEOs and speakers from the
marketplace.2  Our leadoff speaker was Hank Greenberg, the
chairman and CEO of AIG. Tony Nicely, the CEO of GEICO, also
attended. This seminar exemplifies how we are attempting to forge a
much closer connection between the Department and the
marketplace. The seminar focused on the potential impact of S. 900,3
. Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York Hon. Neil D. Levin
delivered this speech at Fordham University School of Law on February 25, 2000, as
part of the the Fordham Institute on Law and Financial Services International
Symposium on Derivatives and Risk Management.
1. See generally N.Y. Ins. Law § 1410 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000) (providing
the legislative framework governing the use of derivatives in the insurance industry).
2. The Seminar was held on January 12,2000.
3. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modification Act, Pub. IL No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act eliminated the many ineffectual barriers that prevented the
"combination of banking, investment banking and insurance." Lee Meyerson & Gary
Rice, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 1156 PLI/Corp 961, 965 (1999). The Act
"also achieves the secondary goal of rationalizing, at least to some degree, the
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and e-commerce, which is an important issue confronting society
today.
At this conference last year, I spoke about initiating fourth-quarter
meetings with all of our licensees. We have now gone through two
cycles of these meetings. This practice has long been utilized in the
banking industry by both the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and
the New York State Banking Department.
The meetings, which took place at the Department, involved the
major licensees. Almost all the insurance companies came to the
Department in November, December, and January to do a post
mortem on 1999 and to discuss key internal and external issues that
may affect their operations for the year 2000.
The goal of these meetings was getting to know our customers. As
a result of getting to know our licensees better, there is now a much
more effective dialogue between them and the Department. Also, the
entire Department has a much better sense that for every action we
take, there will probably be a reaction in the marketplace.
Presently, there is quite an interest in moving towards the use of
risk-based examinations. In the insurance industry, triennial exams
have been the national norm.4 State insurance regulators conduct
insurance examinations of licensed insurers every three-to-five years.5
Since I first arrived on the job, I have been highly critical of the
effectiveness and reliability of these exams because conducting an
exam every three years and then negotiating the final report with the
licensee for yet another year to eighteen months in a rapidly evolving
marketplace is an ineffective way to measure risk in the industry. By
the time a report comes out, what are you in effect measuring?
Unfortunately, by the time the report is issued, the horse is already
out of the barn. Although the Department and the insurance
companies expend a great deal of effort and resources to create these
comprehensive reports, the bottom line is that the Department and
the companies do not benefit as much as we should from our exam
reports.
One of the things the Department has pursued is re-engineering the
examinations process. But is it, as they say, "soup yet?" Well, it is
almost soup. We have had teams charged with developing and
furthering our risk-based examination process. These teams have put
together a risk matrix that is intended to identify the areas of risk in
an insurer's operation. We are very close to rolling it out and will
regulatory structure for the financial services industry." Id.
4. See generally N.Y. Ins. Law § 309 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 2000) (providing
the traditional framework for conducting examinations).
5. See id. § 309(b). Section 309(b) provides that "[t]he superintendent shall
make an examination into the affairs.., of every domestic life insurance company, at
least once in every five years .... Id.
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begin conducting exams that are narrower in scope, but targeted to
the risk profile of the individual institution.
The new exams dovetail with our fourth-quarter meetings, which
helps us to know our companies better and to be more attuned to
what is occurring in the marketplace. I would hope by the end of this
year that the Department will no longer be conducting these
comprehensive exams every three-to-five years, but instead will satisfy
our statutory requirement6 by doing annual, or close to annual, risk-
based exams.
I had a conversation yesterday with George Nichols, President of
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"),
regarding the risk-based exam initiatives that we are implementing at
the Department. He was very interested. I promised that as soon as
we finish the templates in each of the bureaus (Life, Property, and
Health), we will share them with the NAIC so we can hopefully get
the entire system to evolve rapidly towards utilizing risk based exams.
Turning to another topic, an issue we debated internally about
eighteen months ago was what impact the Internet was going to have
on the industry. I remember having a conversation with some of my
staff regarding whether we should require our examiners to look at
the websites of our licensees as part of our market conduct exams. I
wanted a circular letter drafted requiring every one of our companies
to notify us when they had established a website.7
There was some debate about whether the Department's examiners
should inspect the companies' websites. Some people expressed the
view that we should not examine websites as part of a market conduct
exam. Ultimately, we decided to require all of our licensees to notify
us when they set up a website. When you review marketing and sales
conduct, whether there are many online sales occurring or companies
are merely using the internet for marketing, you cannot possibly have
a feel for a licensee's market conduct without reviewing what a
company is doing on its website. We are aggressively integrating this
idea into the Department's current policies.'
Now, moving on to the main issue: derivatives.' Historically, the
insurance industry was less engaged in derivatives transactionsiu than
6. See id. (providing that the superintendent must conduct an exam at least once
every five years).
7. See Supp. No. 1 to Circular Letter No. 15 from State of New York Insurance
Department, to All Licensed Life Insurers et al. (Mar. 25, 1999)
<http://wwv.ins.state.ny.us/c19815sl.htm>.
8. See id. The March 25 letter stated that because "it appears that the Internet
will become a dominant distribution channel of the future," insurance companies
must file certain information with the Department when they establish a web site. Id.
9. Derivatives are complex financial devices that are used to "manage risks,
speculate for profit, and lower financing and transaction costs." Nathan Bouley, Note,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133: Economics, Politics and the
Woes of Accounting for Derivative Instruments, 18 Ann. Rev. Banking L 597, 597-98
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its counterparts in the banking industry. That is why the Insurance
Department has less experience with derivatives supervision than the
bank and securities regulators. The securities and banking industries
have used derivatives heavily for many years since the advent of the
derivatives market. Because of the characteristics of its liabilities, the
Health insurance industry has not been a big user of derivatives.
Similarly, in the Property insurance industry, the ability to hedge the
kinds of risks that Property and Casualty insurers write has been very
difficult. That market, however, is starting to evolve with the creation
of weather derivatives and the securitization of catastrophe risk. The
use of derivatives in the insurance industry is growing in tandem with
the development of products that mirror the unique risks
underwritten by the insurance industry.
On the Life insurance side, a fundamental shift in the business has
occurred. Historically, people were worried about not living long
enough and, therefore, companies were selling traditional death
benefits. Today, however, people are worried about living too long
and out-stripping their savings. The Life insurance industry,
therefore, has shifted heavily in the last three or four years from
selling traditional death benefits to selling retirement and savings
products. Suddenly, their balance sheets are starting to look more like
a bank's or a securities firm's. As the Life insurance industry moves
into accumulation products, there has been a greater dependency on
the risk management techniques that have been previously used by
banks and broker-dealers."
What is a regulator to do? The Department is discovering that
there is a great need for the insurance industry to begin utilizing
available capital markets tools. Rather than discourage the use of
derivatives, the Department has encouraged it. Derivatives, if used
(1999). Definitional tension, however, surrounds the term derivative. See, e.g., Saul S.
Cohen, The Challenges of Derivatives, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1993, 1993 (1995) (stating
"that there is no generally accepted meaning to the term derivative"); Christian 0.
Nagler, Note, Derivatives Disclosure Requirements: Here We Go Again, 6 Cornell J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 441, 443 (1997) (noting that "[a] derivative is a security whose value
depends in some way upon the values of other more basic underlying securities").
There are many different types of financial instruments that are considered
derivatives. See generally Carolyn H. Jackson, Note, Have You Hedged Today? The
Inevitable Advent of Consumer Derivatives, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 3205, 3208-35 (1999)
(discussing the various types of derivatives in general, and swaps in particular).
10. See Michael P. Goldman & Michael J. Pinsel, A Regulatory Overview of the
Insurance Industry's Use of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 1147 PLI/Corp 477, 481
(1999) (stating that "[a]lthough one would expect the insurance industry's use of
derivative instruments to be pervasive" because "insurance companies are among the
largest group of institutional investors," direct derivatives activity by insurance
companies has lagged behind).
11. See generally Jan R. Williams & Tim V. Eaton, The FASB's New Standard on
Derivative Financial Instruments, 'PA J., Oct. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File (discussing how derivatives are important financial tools
that can be used to hedge against interest rate changes and other business risks).
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appropriately with "adult supervision," are very important tools for
risk management.12
Would I like to see insurance companies use derivatives the way the
treasurer of Orange County, California did?'3  No! Would I like
insurance companies to use derivatives as a profit center the way the
treasurer of Procter & Gamble did several years ago? 4 Absolutely
not! But used effectively, derivatives are very important risk
management tools for insurance companies engaging in non-
traditional activities such as retirement and savings products. Today,
as the derivatives market begins to address insurance risks-for
example earthquakes, hurricanes and other such contingencies in the
complex marketplace-it is crucial that companies using derivatives
understand them.
One of the things that we have to do simultaneously is to ensure
that the Department ascends the learning curve at the same time that
we are nudging our licensees to learn how to use derivatives and
develop strong internal controls. The Insurance Department wants to
avoid assuming the role of management consultant to our licensees.
12- See Balancing Risks and Rewards, Best's Review, Jan. 2000, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File; see also Ernest T. Patrikis et al., Managing
Risk Exposure in Derivatives: How to Deal with Recent Regulatory and Legislative
Developments, 873 PLI/Corp 69, 96 (1994) (stating that "derivatives serve a necessary
and constructive purpose [by] helping to manage risk"); Michael S. Lesak, Comment,
FASB's Folly: A Look at the Misguided New Rules on Derivatives Valuation and
Disclosure, 29 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 649, 652 (1998) (recognizing "that the primary
function of derivative instruments is to manage risks for corporations, banks, [and]
insurance companies"). In fact, most corporations and financial institutions use
derivatives for risk management purposes. See Lesak, supra, at 652.
13. The previously successful and sophisticated Treasurer of Orange County lost
$1.5 billion in "inverse floaters" because he bet incorrectly on interest rates. See
Cohen, supra note 9, at 2007-08,2007 n.73 (discussing the disastrous use of derivatives
in Orange county); see also Sarah Lubman & John R. Emshwiller, Hubris and
Ambition in Orange County: Robert Citron's Story, Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1995, at Al
(describing the Orange County fiasco and discussing the background and motivations
of Treasurer Robert Citron); Leslie Wayne, $1.5 Billion Loss Seen for Coutmy, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 2, 1994, at Dl (noting that Orange County suffered a tremendous
financial loss because of the improper use of derivatives). Following the Orange
County disaster, the SEC conducted official investigations to determine if any
wrongdoing had occurred. See Jeffrey Taylor, SEC is Probing Orange County on Two
Fronts, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at A3 (noting that the SEC mounted "a two-pronged
investigation of the Orange County debacle"). Despite the importance of derivatives
as a risk management tool, the "spectacular losses" suffered by derivatives users such
as Orange County have caused a great deal of concern. See Bouley, supra note 9, at
597-99.
14. P&G engaged in a swap transaction which cost the company S157 million
before taxes. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 1995 n.8. See generally G. Bruce Knecht,
P&G Amends Lawsuit Naming Bankers Trust, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1995, at A3
(outlining the swap agreement between P&G and Bankers Trust New York). If
derivatives are used improperly, tremendous losses can result. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne,
Local Governments Lose Millions in Complex and Risky Securities, N.Y. Times, Sept.
25, 1994, at Al (discussing the tremendous losses suffered by local governments that
utilized mortgage derivatives).
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The Department does not want to dictate to the companies what they
can or cannot do with their capital, and then look over their shoulders
to ensure compliance.
If you examine the Department's regulation of the insurance
industry, the real focus is ensuring that there are adequate internal
controls at the company level.15 One of the controversial plans we put
into place was requiring that each licensee's board of directors or a
committee of the board get engaged in the process by approving the
Derivatives Use Plan ("DUP") and ensuring the capability of the staff
managing the derivatives portfolio.16 The bottom line is that the
boards have to step up to the plate. Corporate governance is an
extremely important tool in the derivatives world. The existence of a
regulator is not a substitute for effective corporate governance.
In many ways, insurance companies have been insulated from many
of the market pressures that banks and broker-dealers have
confronted. But it is very important for the boards of directors to be
engaged in what is happening and to understand the complexity of
their own balance sheets. I would also say, quite frankly, that if the
boards do not want to deal with these issues, then these companies
need to upgrade the quality of their board by hiring more
sophisticated directors. There is not a lot of sympathy from me or
from my Department for board members who are unwilling to deal
with these critical issues.
The Department has implemented another relatively new practice
in the past two years. When we see a company doing something we
do not like, we go to a board meeting or a meeting of the audit
committee. We get the board of directors engaged. It is amazing how
you get the attention of management when you talk to the board of
directors.
Last year we talked about getting derivatives legislation passed.
Subsequently, derivatives legislation was adopted and now regulations
are in place.17 Through this legislation, the Department attempted to
expand derivatives authority for all of our licensees and, at the same
time, eliminate some of the inconsistencies. It was not a level playing
field for the Life and Property & Casualty insurance industries. There
were different rules. 8  There were limitations in the types of
15. See generally N.Y. Ins. Law § 1410 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 2000) (providing
regulations that attempt to ensure adequate internal controls within insurance
companies).
16. See id. § 1410(b)(3)(A). Section 1410(b)(3)(A) states that "the board of
directors of the insurer or a committee thereof charged with the responsibility for
supervising investments shall: (i) authorize such transactions, (ii) assure that all
individuals [responsible for] ... derivative transactions are suitably qualified and...
(iii) approve a derivative use plan." Id.
17. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 178 (2000) (providing new
legislation governing the use of derivatives by insurance companies).
18. See generally N.Y. Ins. Law § 1403(d)(2) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 2000)
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derivatives that could be utilized.' 9 Property & Casualty companies
were basically limited to using exchange-traded futures and options.-2
In light of the evolving ways to manage the kind of risks that
Property & Casualty insurers have on their balance sheets, the idea of
the industry being limited to using only exchange-traded derivatives
was not going to be very helpful in managing risk. The Department,
therefore, has allowed Property and Casualty insurers to go beyond
that. We found that there were inappropriate measures of the limits
on the amount of derivatives that could be utilized and, therefore, we
have embraced a more expansive view. There were also inconsistent
applications to foreign-licensed insurers.2 1 In short, there were many
anomalies in the law.
The new law takes a reasonable and prudent approach to
derivatives authorization. The new law authorizes derivative
transactions for hedging purposes and for certain income generation
purposes.' It is not a huge change, but we do allow covered calls to
be written.' As I mentioned before, the new law requires that the
insurer's board of directors specifically authorize and monitor
derivatives activity, including appointing the individuals responsible
for such activity.24 This was also somewhat controversial. But again,
this requirement promotes involvement by the boards of directors and
embraces a belief in the importance of corporate governance and,
therefore, is part of the new law. The new law also requires each
insurer to submit a DUP to the Department for approval on an annual
basis. 5 And finally, another controversial aspect of the new law that
caused a visceral reaction from the accounting and auditing profession
was the requirement that the internal controls relative to derivative
(setting forth guidelines for the buying and selling of derivatives).
19. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 175 (1999) (setting forth guidelines
allowing only a few types of derivatives for hedging purposes): see also id. § 177
(noting that property/casualty insurers had previously been limited to engaging -in
the sale of exchange traded call options").
20. See id. § 177 (recognizing the previous limitations on property/casualty
insurers).
21. See id. § 175 (stating that the "authority to hedge was given solely to
domestic... insurers"); see also id. § 177.2 (qualifying applicability to foreign
insurers).
22. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 1410(c) (providing the statutory framework allowing
insurers to engage in derivatives transactions in order to hedge risk).
23. See id. § 1410(d). Section 1410(d) provides that "[a]n insurer may enter into
income generation transactions under this section only through the sale of call options
on securities, provided that the insurer holds, or can immediately acquire ... the
underlying securities during the entire period the option is outstanding." Id.
24. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 1410(b)(3)(A); see also supra note 16 (discussing §
410(a)(3)(A) in more detail... .
25. See id § 1410(b)(3)(B) (stating that "the insurer shall submit a written
derivative use plan or amendment thereto to the superintendent for approval").
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transactions be reviewed as part of the annual audit by the
independent CPA.26
Upon examination of the law, it is evident that the Department
does not look over companies' shoulders, and the Department does
not want to. Essentially, the Department wants to ensure the
adequacy of companies' internal controls to make sure that there is
"adult supervision" in the use of derivatives and prevent a repeat of
Orange County or Proctor & Gamble.27 If you look at the elements of
the new law, I think you will agree that it is a very sensible approach.
We have rationalized derivatives authority. The Department has also
expanded the types of acceptable instruments and provided a great
flexibility for new instruments which will evolve and come onto the
market.' Also, there is now a more appropriate definition for valuing
derivatives that are on the books.29
But at the same time, we are saying, "okay, you've got greater
authority; now you've got to be more responsible." The board has to
be involved, approve the DUP, and make sure that they are
comfortable with the staff.3" Companies have to submit a DUP to the
Department so we can see the changes from year to year. In a "belt
and suspenders" approach, we require that the outside auditor
examine the company's internal controls as part of the annual audit.
These requirements should help everyone sleep better at night,
including policyholders and boards of directors. I do not believe that
these new requirements will result in the Department micro-managing
insurance companies. On the contrary, the focus is on education and
strengthening insurance companies' internal controls. The new
legislation is simply trying to maximize the value of corporate
governance.
Newly enacted Regulation 163 defines terms31 and provides a bright
line rule as to what the Department wants included in the DUP.32
Regulation 163 also delineates what the Department considers to be
effective management oversight and adequate reporting.33 The
26. See id. § 1410(b)(5). Section 1410(b)(5) provides that '[a]n insurer which
enters into derivative transactions.., shall be required to include, as part of the
evaluation of accounting procedures and internal controls.., a statement describing
the assessment by the independent certified public accountant of the internal controls
relative to derivative transactions." Id.
27. For a discussion of the significant losses suffered by Orange County and P&G
as a result of risky derivative transactions, see supra notes 13-14.
28. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 1410; N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 178 (2000).
29. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 178.3(b) (providing a new method
to value derivatives that are on an insurance company's books).
30. See id. §178.5(b)-(c). Section 178.5(b) places a greater responsibility on the
board and Section 178.5(c) requires that the board, or a committee responsible for
derivatives transactions, "inform management of its desired risk tolerance levels." Id.
31. See id. § 178.3.
32. See id. § 178.4.
33. See id. § 178.5.
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regulation further addresses internal controls, documentation
requirements, and sets accounting standards for derivatives
transactions.34
It is important to note that the Department's approach towards
DUPs acknowledges that one size does not fit all. The Department
allows for individual differences at every company, and that is
healthy.' No two companies are the same and no two companies
have the same market strategy, and therefore, companies should have
the flexibility to develop different derivative use strategies.
I will admit that we made one modest mistake this year. Regulation
163 went into effect in July of 1999, and companies already engaged in
derivatives activities were grand fathered in until December 31,
1999.36 The Department made a mistake by failing to require that the
new DUPs, which we need to review for the year 2000, be submitted
earlier than December 31, 1999. The December 31 deadline did not
give the Department enough time to review all of the plans. In fact,
we are still reviewing some of the plans. We received over 130 DUPs
in total. We are still wading through them and making headway; but
my guess is that next year we will require that companies submit the
DUPs earlier.
I will also tell you that I am not embarrassed in any way by the fact
that the Department has not yet reviewed all 130 plans. Although I
would like to have had the plans done by the end of March, the
Department is ascending the same steep learning curve as the
industry. Many of the DUPs were sent back to the insurance
companies to be corrected and resubmitted. The bottom line is that
the industry and the Department are going through this for the first
time. This is a very exciting period, and my guess is that next year it
will probably go smoothly because we will have the process down pat
by then.
The Department has established an internal Capital Markets
Group.37 We moved one of our senior people from the Property
Bureau and named him Director of Financial Solvency Strategy.'
34. See id §§ 178.7-178.8.
35. See generally Cohen, supra note 9, at 1996 ("Whether a derivative instrument
is appropriate for a particular end-user ultimately depends upon an entity's
management and internal controls ....
36. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R & Regs. tit. 11, § 178.11 (1999) (providing a grand
father provision for companies that were already engaged in derivative transactions).
37. See New York State Insurance Department, Press Release, New York State
Insurance Department Hires First Capital Markets Specialist, (Mar. 1, 1999)
<http'//www.ins.state.ny.us/p9903011.htm>. The Capital Markets group was formed
to allow the Department to "keep pace with the changing financial marketplace and
the impact it has on the insurance industry." Id.
3& See New York State Insurance Department, Press Release, Levin Appoints
Michael Moriarty as Director of Financial Solvency Strategy, (Oct. 4, 1999)
<http://www.ins.state.ny.us/p9910041.htm>. The appointment of Mr. Moriarty was
part of the Department's "continuing efforts to direct regulatory strategies towards
2000]
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This pulls together how we are going to work with federal and state
regulators, begin establishing a better dialogue with regulators
overseas, and deal with issues such as derivatives and capital markets,
whether such financial instruments are used for hedging, investing, or
issuance purposes. This development will also help evaluate the
impact of the risk-based exams and try to assess an insurer's
enterprise risk. The Department, therefore, now has a group that is
the focal point for all of these issues. The good news is that the
Department is building up its capabilities internally while, at the same
time, the industry is hopefully understanding and developing best
practices.
The Department is also doing a great deal of education internally.
For example, we intend to have a number of our senior examiners
attend an S&P credit analysis course. The Department is also
working with an outside party to conduct seminars about capital
markets and derivatives. So, although not everybody at the
Department will be a capital markets or derivatives expert, the
knowledge of these areas within the Department has increased
dramatically in the last twelve months. I expect that over the next
twelve months the in-house knowledge will probably double or triple.
I would like to think that we have our act together in New York
State. We have responded quickly to disruptions in the marketplace.
For example, one of the first things that the Department's Capital
Markets Group worked on was the General American problem.39
General American had very substantial losses because it had written
nine-month liabilities, and included seven-day put options that had
not been reported.4" Also, the reinvestment on the asset side did not
match in duration.41 We know the unfortunate result for General
American; it was put into receivership and is now part of Met Life.42
One of the measures taken by the Department in the aftermath of
General American (and I believe we were the first and only state to
do it) was sending out letters to all of our licensees, the Life insurance
sector in particular. The letter asked them about any discrepancies
regarding their reported liabilities- -does the stated term actually
match any embedded put? We sent out letters to all of our licensees
in an attempt to identify whether there was truth in disclosure,
because the critical issue with General American was that they had
reported nine-month term production but there were seven-day puts
in the policies.43
more risk-based financial review and real-time oversight of the industry's financial
practices." Id.




43. See Circular Letter No. 35 from State of New York Insurance Department, to
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The other thing we learned from the General American saga is that
you can have a run on an insurance company. The run was caused by
a rating agency downgrade. The institutional investors had seven-day
puts and caused a run on the insurance company.' We have asked the
life insurance industry to provide information regarding any
discrepancies about stated liabilities and embedded puts.45
We also sent all of our licensees questionnaires regarding their
Asset/Liability Management ("ALM") capabilities and internal risk
management monitoring processes.' We have notified our licensees
that we will be looking at their asset liability management capabilities
and their ability to monitor risk going forward as part of our ongoing
examinations. The Department is attempting to evolve with the
marketplace.47
Although I am sure everybody has overdosed on Gramm-Leach-
Bliley by now, I am going to talk briefly about S. 900 for a moment.
One of the big unknowns for financial holding companies under
Gramm-Leach-Bliley is whether the Fed is going to look at risk and
capital requirements on a consolidated or de-consolidated basis. The
question, therefore, is how will the Fed compute its overall total
capital requirement for the new financial holding company, given the
varying capital standards between banks and insurers.
The other issue at hand here, one that everybody needs to think
about, is whether or not there is an opportunity for regulatory
accounting arbitrage. If you are a financial holding company you may
have an insurance subsidiary, a bank subsidiary, or possibly a broker-
dealer subsidiary. If you are engaged in derivatives activities out of
the insurance subsidiary, you will have different capital requirements
than you would have if you engaged in such activity out of the bank
subsidiary. There is a question of how this situation will play out
because there is a short-term opportunity for regulatory accounting
arbitrage. Again, the concern is that there is a gap depending on
where you house some of these derivatives activities.
The final thing that I will discuss briefly is privacy.' Although
privacy is not really the focus of this symposium, I want to note that
All Licensed Life Insurers et al. (Nov. 24, 1999)
<http://www.ins.state.ny.us/cl99_35.htm>.
44. See Balancing Risks and Rewards, supra note 12.
45. See Circular Letter No. 35 from State of New York Insurance Department,
supra note 43.
46. See id.
47. See id. (stating that "[i]n the year 2000, the Department may be requiring
enhanced reporting from insurers to facilitate better monitoring of liquidity risks
deriving from asset/liability mismatches").
48. "It is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has an
affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to
protect the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal
information." 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801 (Supp. 2000).
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the bill requires state insurance regulators to issue privacy
regulations.4 9 The New York Department has already begun the
process internally and has reached out to our licensees for input. The
Department is also working closely with federal regulators to
determine what type of privacy policy we should issue.
A big concern resulting from the new bill is the potential issuance of
fifty different privacy policies from the various state insurance
departments: nightmare scenario for insurance companies. An even
greater risk is that the states may get involved with regulating privacy
for all financial activities and exceed S. 900 instead of tracking it. The
potential problem is that a company such as Citigroup may be
confronted with a nightmare regulatory scheme in which some states
provide an opt-in requirement while other states provide an opt-out
requirement. 0 In some cases, states may even require an opt-in
requirement for inter-affiliate transactions.
Therefore, although I would not exactly call privacy the sleeper
issue coming out of S. 900, the legislation poses a serious risk for
financial services conglomerates. If you were Citigroup, for example,
and had fifty different hard line privacy rules to deal with, you would
suddenly find that a lot of the synergies you attempted to achieve by
combining and forming one entity had disappeared. The privacy
issue, therefore, is obviously something that needs to be watched
carefully.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley preserved the primacy of the state insurance
supervisors with regard to insurance supervision.51 I attended a
meeting two weeks ago with my fellow commissioners, however, and
the truth of the matter is that I believe that the NAIC recognizes that
it is not business as usual. The ACLI is very focused on whether or
not to move towards a federal option.
I believe that the states now recognize the need to process filings
more quickly and the need to create some form of national treatment,
whether it is for large institutions or small, in order to accommodate
the national players in the United States. If we do not, we run the risk
of having American insurance companies being acquired by European
49. See id. § 6801(b).
50. See id. § 6802(b).
51. See id. § 6711. Section 6711 provides that "[tihe insurance activities of any
person... shall be functionally regulated by the States." Id. The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act reaffirmed "the validity of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the primacy of
the states in regulating the business of insurance." Meyerson & Rice, supra note 3, at
996. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "[tlhe business of insurance ... shall
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1994). The McCarran-Ferguson Act further
provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supercede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance.., unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance." Id. §
1012(b).
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and Asian companies operating under more efficient regulatory
frameworks. Again, while the good news is that Gramm-Leach-Bliley
preserves and recognizes the role of McCarran-Ferguson, nobody
will say at this point "that's great, now we can hide." That is not the
case.
All the state insurance departments are working hard-certainly the
New York Department is-to make significant changes in the way
reviewing forms and rate filings are processed, and to improve the
turn-around times to ensure that companies can be nimble in the
marketplace. 3 The Department also, as I mentioned before, is
moving towards risk-based exams. I would like to think, based on
what I have heard from my colleagues in the other states, that
everybody sees the writing on the wall.
Major companies today are looking for national treatment.
Whether such treatment comes from the states or a federal
counterpart, we need to provide a more seamless national framework
for the insurance industry in today's marketplace. In that regard, I
think that people can expect to see significant changes coming out of
our Department and all of the state insurance departments.
52 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
53. See Circular Letter No. 21 from State of New York Insurance Department, to
All Insurers Authorized to Write Life Insurance and Annuities et al. (May 21, 1999)
<http://www.ins.state.ny.us/c199_21.htm>.
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